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spillovers we observe. We attempt to fill this gap by analyzing how both trade links and the largely ignored
financial sector links influence the pattern of fundamentals-based contagion.  We examine the role of
international bank lending, the potential for cross-market hedging, and bilateral and third-party trade in the
propagation of crises.
JEL Classification Codes: F30, F32, F34 
1 Graciela L. Kaminsky, George Washington University, Washington DC 20052. Carmen M. Reinhart
(corresponding author), University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742, (301) 405-7006, FAX
(301) 403-8107, e-mail: creinhar@wam.umd.edu.  This paper was prepared for the Duke University
conference “Globalization, Capital Market Crises and Economic Reform.”  The authors wish to thank
Patrick Conway, Alan Drazen, Aart Kray, Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, Vincent Reinhart, Roberto Rigobon,
Jorge Roldos, Andres Velasco, two anonymous referees, and conference participants at Globalizatio ,
Capital Markets Crises, and Economic Reform, Arizona State University, the Bank of England, University
of California, San Diego, and the World Bank for useful comments and discussion, Sergio Schmukler for
kindly providing the data on mutual funds and Ian Anderson, Mark Giancola, and Ioannis Tokatlidis for
superb research assistance.
1
2Earlier this year, so many families living in the fashionable suburb of San Pedro Garza Garcia invested
in Russian bonds that it became known as San Pedrosburgo. Now this wealthy enclave feels more like
Stalingrad...
The Wall Street Journal, November 18, 1998 
On explaining why the Mexican stock market plummeted in
August and September as leveraged investors faced margin calls.
I. Introduction
No doubt, historians will remember the early 1980s as a period of systemic crisis in the emerging
world.  The Latin American countries, with their high debt burdens, fell like dominoes into an abyss of
successive devaluations, banking crises, and deep and protracted recessions.  Several countries in Asia
were also deeply shaken. Yet, possibly, because much of the blame was placed on poor domestic policies
and high real interest rates in the United States, little attention was given at the time to the possibility that
financial crises could be contagious.  After the Tequila crisis of 1994-95, the Asian flu of 1997, and the
Russian virus of 1998, not to mention the Exchange Rate Mechanism Crisis of 1992 and 1993, economists
are now producing a growing volume of research on the “new” subject of contagion.
Yet, contagion has been understood to be different things across different studies.  Crises could be
synchronous across countries because of a common adverse shock (i.e. a rise in world interest rates).  But
symmetric shocks are usually not included in most definitions of contagion. In an early study on the
subject, Calvo and Reinhart (1996) distinguish between fundamentals-based contagion, which arises when
the infected country is linked to others via trade or finance, and “true” contagion which is the kind that
arises when common shocks and all channels of potential interconnection are either not present or have
been controlled for.  Most often, true contagion is associated with herding behavior on the part of investors-
-be it rational, as in Calvo and Mendoza (1998), or not.  
Few studies have attempted to examine empirically the channels through which the disturbances
are transmitted.  In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap by analyzing how fundamentals-based contagion
could arise due to both trade links and the largely ignored financial sector links. We examine the role of
3various creditors, including international banks and mutual funds, traders’ potential cross-market hedging,
and bilateral and third-party trade in the propagation of crises. Some of the conclusions that emerge from
our analysis are:
First, as other studies have suggested, we find evidence that contagion is more regional than
global.1  But evidence on the channels of transmission, suggest there are dangers in extrapolating from
history.  While inter-regional trade in goods and services has not increased markedly in the past few years
(a notable exception is Chile’s rising trade with Asia), inter-regional trade in assets has skyrocketed.  This
makes it more likely that if Korean asset prices fall, so too will Brazilian asset prices.
Second, susceptibility to contagion is highly nonlinear.  A single country falling victim to a crisis is
not a particularly good predictor of crisis elsewhere, be it in the same region or in another part of the globe. 
However, if several countries fall prey, then it is a different story.  That is, the probability of a domestic
crisis rises sharply if a core group of countries are already infected.  
Third, observational equivalence is a serious obstacle in understanding the channels of
transmission.  Is the regional complexion of contagion due to trade links, as some studies have suggested,
or is it due to financial links--particularly through the role played by banks?  Our results suggest that it is
difficult to distinguish among the two, because most countries that are linked in trade are also linked in
finance.  In the Asian crises of 1997, Japanese banks played a similar role in propagating disturbances to
that played by U.S. banks in the debt crisis of the early 1980s.  Indeed, when we group countries in
accordance with their exposure to a common creditor, knowing that there is a crisis in that core group has a
higher predictive power than knowing that a country in the same bilateral or third-party trade clusters.  The
improvement obtained in forecasting performance of controlling for financial sector links in our sample is
greater than the improvement gained by controlling for trade links.
Fourth, an analysis of two potential victims of contagion, Argentina after Mexico and Indonesia
after Thailand indicates that financial linkages were the more likely culprits, given that both bilateral and
4third party trade links with the infected country were weak.  In the case of Indonesia, it was also part of the
same Japanese commercial bank borrowing cluster as Thailand.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II briefly reviews the theories of contagion and takes
stock of the existing empirical evidence on these issues.  Section III assesses the incidence of contagion
across regions and time, while Section IV attempts to discriminate across the various channels of
transmission. Section V discusses some of the recent contagious episodes and concludes.
II. Theory and Evidence: A Review
Models of contagion have attempted to provide a framework that explains why a shock in one
country may be transmitted elsewhere.  Our review of this literature emphasizes the empirical implications
of these models.  
1. Defining contagion
As noted, the definition of contagion has varied considerably across papers. Eichengreen, et. al.
(1996) focused on contagion as a case where knowing that there is a crisis elsewhere increases the
probability of a crisis at home.  This is the definition of contagion that we will explore in the remainder of
this paper.  Specifically, we control for a broad range of country-idiosyncratic fundamentals (i.e. real
exchange rate, reserves, etc.) and for fundamentals which are common across countries (i.e., international
interest rates).  What we are really interested in are the possible links, be it through trade or finance, that
give rise to “fundamentals-based” spillovers.  Hence, our analysis does not directly speak to the issue of
“animal spirits” or herding behavior.
2. Theories of contagion and their empirical implications
To explain why crises tend to be bunched, some recent models have revived Nurkse’s story of
competitive devaluations, which emphasized trade, be it bilateral or with a third party.2  Once one country
has devalued, it makes it costly (in terms of a loss of competitiveness and output) for other countries to
maintain their parity. Hence, an empirical implication of this type of  model is that we should observe a
5high volume of trade among the “synchronized” devaluers.3 
Another family of models has stressed the role of trade in financial assets, particularly in the
presence of information asymmetries.  Calvo and Mendoza (1998) present a model where the fixed costs of
gathering and processing country-specific information give rise to herding behavior, even when investors
are rational.  Kodres and Pritsker (1998) focus on the role played by investors who engage in cross-market
hedging of macroeconomic risks.  In either case, these models suggest that the channels of transmission
come from the global diversification of financial portfolios.  As such, they have the empirical implication
that countries which have more internationally-traded financial assets and more liquid markets are likely to
be more vulnerable to contagion.  Cross-market hedging usually requires a moderately high correlation of
asset returns.  The implication is that countries whose asset returns exhibit a high degree of comovement
with the infected country (such as Argentina with Mexico or Malaysia with Thailand) will be more
vulnerable to contagion via cross-market hedges.
Calvo (1998) has emphasized the role of liquidity.  A leveraged investor facing margin calls needs
to sell (to an uninformed counterpart) his or her asset holdings.  Because of the information asymmetries, a
“lemons problem” arises and the asset can only be sold at a firesale price. A variant of this story can be
told about an open-end fund portfolio manager who needs to raise liquidity in anticipation of future
redemptions.  In either case, the strategy will be not to sell the asset whose price has already collapsed but
other assets in the portfolio.  In doing so, however, other asset prices are depressed and the original
disturbance spreads across markets.
One potential channel of transmission that has been largely ignored in the contagion literature but
that is stressed in this paper is the role of common lenders, in particular commercial banks.  U.S. banks had
an extensive exposure to Latin America in the early 1980s, much in the way that Japanese banks did during
the Asian crisis of 1997.4  The behavior of foreign banks can both exacerbate the original crisis, by calling
loans and drying up credit lines, but can also propagate crises by calling loans elsewhere.  The need to re-
6balance the overall risk of the bank’s asset portfolio and to recapitalize and provision following the initial
losses can lead to a marked reversal in bank credit across markets where the bank has exposure.
The bulk of the empirical literature suggests that there is evidence of contagion, be it of the
fundamentals-based spillovers or of the animal spirit, sunspot variety. Very few studies, however, have
aimed at examining the possible underlying causes.  Eichengreen, et.al. (1996) attempted to discriminate
among a bilateral trade link channel and a “wake-up call hypothesis,” where similarities to the crisis
country in fundamentals lead investors to reassess the risk of the other countries.  Glick and Rose (1998)
studied these issues further in a broader country context, while Wolf (1997) sought to explain the pairwise
correlations in stock returns by bilateral trade and other common macroeconomic fundamentals.  All
studies conclude that trade linkages play an important role in the propagation of shocks.  Because trade
tends to be more intra- than inter-regional in nature, some of these studies conclude that this helps explain
why contagion tends to be regional rather than global.  With a couple of exceptions, financial sector
linkages have been largely ignored  (see Baig and Goldfajn, 1998, Frankel and Schmukler, 1998 and
Kaminsky and Schmukler, 1999).
III.  The Incidence of Contagion
In this section we examine the links among currency crises both globally and regionally.  To
proceed, we need to identify the dates of currency crises, gauge the odds of a crisis in a country when other
countries are in turmoil, and control for the relevant economic fundamentals.  Our sample is based on
monthly data for 1970-1998 and it includes 80 currency crises episodes for a number of industrial and
developing countries. The former include: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain, and Sweden.  The latter
focus on: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the
Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  An analysis of transition economies in the
aftermath of Russia would have provided useful insights on contagion channels, but our methodology 
requires sufficiently long time series so as to allow us to distinguish between what is the “normal” behavior
7of an indicator during “tranquil” periods and “anomalous” behavior during crises periods. The transition
economies offer little capacity to assess what is normal.5
1.  Definition of crisis
Most often, speculative attacks have been resolved through a devaluation of the currency or its
flotation.  But central banks can and do use contractionary monetary policies and sell their foreign
exchange reserves to defend the currency.  High interest rate defenses were not uncommon in the wake of
the Asian and Russian crises, while Argentina lost 20 percent of its foreign exchange reserves in a few
weeks following the Mexican peso crisis of 1994.  Thus an index of currency crises should capture these
different manifestations of speculative attacks, be they successful or otherwise.  However, in the 1970s and
early 1980s many of the countries in our sample had regulated financial markets with no market-determined
interest rates.  For this reason, our crisis index only incorporates reserve losses and depreciation.  The
index is a weighted average of these two indicators with weights such that the two components have equal
sample volatility.  This weighting scheme prevents the much greater volatility in the exchange rate (owing
to several episodes of mega-devaluations) to dominate the crisis measure.6  Becaus  changes in the
exchange rate enter with a positive weight and reserves enter with a negative weight, large positive readings
of this index indicate speculative attacks.  Readings that are three standard deviations above its mean are
classified as crises.  Less extreme readings (say two-standard deviations from the mean), which we do not
examine here, would identify periods of turbulence.  The crises readings from this index do map well onto
the chronology of events (i.e. devaluations, suspension of convertibility, etc.) for these countries. 
2. Contagion: Preliminary Assessment
To examine whether the likelihood of crises is higher when there are crises in other countries, we
begin by calculating the unconditional probability of a crisis.  The unconditional probability that a crisis
will occur in the next 24 months over the entire sample is simply the number of currency crises in the
sample times 24 divided by the number of observations.  As shown in Table 1, under the heading P(C),
8these calculations yield an unconditional probability of 29 percent.  We next calculate a family of
conditional probabilities.  If knowing that there is a currency crisis elsewhere helps predict a currency crisis
at home, then, the probability of a currency crisis, conditional on that information, denoted by P(C*CE),
should be higher than the unconditional one.  The table also reports the noise-to-signal ratio for the various
groupings.7  The lower the  noise-to-signal ratio, the more reliable is the indicator. 
First, as regards the results presented in Table 1, at least at the global level, knowing that there is a
single crisis elsewhere is not a particularly helpful piece of information for predicting a future crisis.  This
contrasts with the results presented in Eichengreen,et.al. (1996), who find stronger evidence of the
predictive capacity of a crisis elsewhere variable.  We suspect, however, that their results are influenced by
the heavy representation of European countries in their sample.  As we will discuss below, the pattern of
contagion seems to be more regional than global in scope and the predictive ability of knowing that there is
a crisis elsewhere depends importantly on where elsewhere happens to be.  However, if one-half or more of
the countries in the sample are having currency crises, this increases the likelihood of a crisis to 55 percent,
or almost double the unconditional probability of crisis of 29 percent.  Indeed, this result is similar to those
found in some of the empirical papers on bank contagion.  When the problem becomes that systemic, the
chances of escaping unscathed are slim.  Thus, it appears that the relationship between the probability of a
crisis at home and the number of crises elsewhere is highly nonlinear.
We also examined these probabilities at the regional level (Table 2).  There are three groups:  Asia,
which includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand; Europe, which encompasses the four
Nordic countries in our sample plus Israel, Turkey and Spain: and Latin America, which consists of
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In all three regions
the probability of crisis conditioned on crisis elsewhere increases sharply as the number of casualties rise. 
When the proportion of infected countries increases over the 50 percent hurdle, the conditional probability
of crisis increases from about 27 percent to 67 percent in Asia; in Latin America it increases from 29 to 69
9percent if half or more of the countries are in crisis.  
3.  Macroeconomic fundamentals
Naturally, an epidemic may arise when multiple individuals are exposed to a common virus. The
global analogy to the common virus can be found in international interest rate fluctuations, which have had
much to do in explaining the cycles in capital flows to emerging markets.8   Since, in turn, abrupt swings in
capital flows have done much to trigger currency crises we need to control for such common fundamentals
as well as those that are country specific.  The approach taken here follows the “signals” approach
described in detail in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) and the construction of a composite leading indicator
of currency crises outlined in Kaminsky (1998).  A brief sketch of this methodology follows and the
interested reader is referred to those papers for greater detail.
We begin by constructing a composite index that captures the fragility of the economy on the eve
of crises.  The index summarizes the behavior of 18 individual financial and macroeconomic time series. 
Each indicator may issue one or more signals or warnings in the 24 months preceding the crisis.9  For
example, there may be an unusually sharp decline in foreign exchange reserves or in stock prices.  If a
signal is issued, it is assigned a value of one. Hence, if all 18 indicators issued a signal on a given month
the value of the composite indicator would be 18 if all signals are weighted equally.  However, as shown in
earlier papers, the quality of the indicators is highly heterogenous.10  For this reason, we weigh each signal
by the inverse of the noise-to-signal ratio of the particular indicator that is issuing the signal.  We can then
construct a sample-based vector of conditional probabilities for currency crises.  One set of probabilities
will control for the macroeconomic fundamentals, denoted by P(C*F)t, another set of probabilities will
control for both the fundamentals and information about crises elsewhere, P(C*F, CE)t, and a third, which
we call the “naive” forecast controls for neither--hence, it is the simple unconditional probability of crisis.
To assess the marginal contribution of  knowing whether and how many crises are elsewhere we conduct a
horserace between the naive forecasts, those that take into account the fundamentals, and those that also
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add information on crises elsewhere.  To evaluate the average closeness of the predicted probabilities of
crises and the actual realizations, as measured by a zero-one dummy variable, we calculate the quadratic
probability score (QPS),
where k=1,2,3 refers to the indicator, Pt 
k, refers to the probability associated with that indicator and Rt are
the zero-one realizations.  The QPS ranges from zero to two, with a score of zero corresponding to perfect
accuracy.  Table 3 reports the scores, for the naive forecasts, the forecasts on the basis of the
macroeconomic fundamentals and the forecasts that also take into account information about crises
elsewhere.  The scores are given for the entire sample, as well as the regional groups.  The main result that
arises from this exercise is that adding information about crisis elsewhere reduces the prediction error, even
after the fundamentals have been accounted for. The gains from incorporating information on crises
elsewhere are highest for Asia (a 29 percent improvement in forecasting accuracy, shown in the last
column). For Latin America and Europe, the gains are more modest and in the 5-6 percent range.
IV. On the Channels of Transmission
We next turn our attention toward investigating what some of the international propagation
mechanisms may be.  Specifically, we consider four channels through which shocks can be transmitted
across borders; two channels deal with the linkages among financial markets, be it through foreign bank
lending or globally diversified portfolios, and two deal with trade in goods and services. 
1.  Common bank creditor
As discussed in Section II, the studies that have attempted to analyze the channels through which
contagion arises have found a prominent role for linkages on the basis of trade in goods and services. 
However, this line of enquiry does not speak to the fact that countries that engage in trade in goods and
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services typically also have strong connections through financial arrangements that facilitate trade--
particularly through commercial banks.  Just as there appears to be natural regional trade blocs, so there
appear to be regional blocs that depend on a single common creditor country.  This may help explain cross-
border spillovers, since if a bank is confronted with a marked rise in nonpeforming loans in one country, it
is likely to be called upon to reduce the overall risk of its assets by pulling out of other high risk projects
elsewhere--possibly in other emerging markets.  Furthermore, it will lend less (if at all), as it is forced to
recapitalize, provision, and adjust to its lower level of wealth.
Tables 4 and 5 present evidence on the incidence of regional borrowing arrangements from both the
perspective of the borrower as well as the perspective of the lender for Asia and Latin America.  On the eve
of the Thai crisis, 54 percent of Thai liabilities were to Japanese banks.  Most of the other countries in the
region, with the exception of the Philippines which has fared well by comparison, also depended heavily on
Japanese commercial bank lending.  From the perspective of the Japanese banks, Thai exposure was also
not trivial.  It accounted for the highest share of claims on emerging markets (22 percent) and more than
twice that of China.  As the Thai crisis unraveled, taking advantage of the short-term nature of their credits,
Japanese banks began to call loans--not just in Thailand but all over the region.  Commercial bank credit to
the five affected countries (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) shifted from an
inflow of over $50 billion in 1996 to an outflow of $21 billion in the following year.  A regional liquidity
crunch got under way.
While it is tempting to conclude that such transmission mechanisms are new to the global economy,
they have been with us for some time.  Mexico’s share of U.S. claims on total claims on emerging markets
was also the highest among emerging markets in 1982 and, like its Thai counterparts, it was also 22
percent (Table 5).  Also like the Asian cluster, Latin American countries obtain their lion’s share of their
commercial bank credit from U.S. banks and like in the Asian crises, U.S. banks pulled out from Latin
America at the time of the debt crisis.
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To step beyond the anecdotal evidence and systematically investigate whether common creditors
(banks) are a possible channel of contagion, we clustered a subset of the countries in our sample into two
groups--that group which borrows mostly from U.S. banks and that group which relies heavily of Japanese
commercial bank lending.  We could not identify a common European bank cluster in our sample. The first
group encompasses most (but not all) of the Latin American countries in our sample and includes:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  Bolivia and Peru were excluded as
they have more heterogeneous sources of international bank credit. The Philippines, which has an exposure
to U.S. banks that is about three times the average for Asia and comparable to many of the Latin American
countries, is also included in this cluster.  The Japanese bank cluster thus comprises of Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Thailand.  Had China and Korea been part of our sample, these would have been included in
the Japanese bank cluster, as these countries relied on Japanese bank credit (Table 4).
Table 6 reports the results for the joint estimation of conditional and unconditional probabilities for
the two banks clusters.  We estimate these jointly as disaggregation among the two clusters can be subject
to small sample problems, in that the number of crises in the sub-sample is relatively small.  The marginal
contribution of knowing that a country in that cohort has a crisis does not add much information when there
are few crises.  However, once several countries in the cohort become infected, the conditional probability
of a crisis jumps to 83.5 percent, well above the comparable conditional probability of 54.7 percent for a
crisis elsewhere reported in Table 1 and the unconditional probability of 31.5 percent for the bank
clusters.11  These results suggest, that perhaps much of what has been attributed to trade has to do with
financial sector linkages.  Furthermore, the QPS scores for forecasts that include information on both
fundamentals and crises elsewhere in the bank cluster are significantly lower at all standard confidence
levels than those that do not control for crises in the cluster (Table 6, column 5).
2.  Liquidity channels, mutual funds, and cross-market hedging
While banks are important common lenders, they are not the only lenders to the emerging world. 
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Portfolio flows to emerging markets surged in the early-to-mid-1990s.  Hence, just as a commercial bank
may call its loans to Malaysia after Thailand has a crisis, so can a diversified investor choose (or be forced
by margin calls) to sell his or her Argentinean bond and equity holdings after Mexico devalues.  Some of
the models that stress this form of contagion were discussed in Section II.  In order to be of any
consequence, however, this channel of transmission requires that there be sufficient asset market liquidity. 
If  bond and equity markets are so underdeveloped that portfolio flows are trivial, then clearly this channel
of transmission is not likely to be quantitatively important. In other words, if country’s equity or bonds are
not internationally traded to begin with, such liquidations are not a problem.
Table 8 provides a profile of emerging market mutual fund holdings on the eve of the Asian crisis. 
It is clear that there is a wide diversity of representation across markets, with Hong Kong, Brazil, and
Mexico (in that order) being among the most highly represented (and also the most liquid) markets.  It is
noteworthy that two Latin American countries that did not even experience as much as a mild hiccup in
their equity markets around the Mexican crisis are Colombia and Venezuela (see Calvo and Reinhart,
1996), which are barely represented in the mutual fund portfolios.  
While there is broad variation across markets in the extent to which they are represented in global
investor’s portfolios, there is also quite a degree of diversity in the extent that asset price returns correlate
across countries. Table 7, which shows the pairwise correlations of stock returns (in US dollars) across
selected markets, provides evidence in this regard.  For the sake of simplicity, we will classify a pairwise
correlation of 0-0.20 as low, 0.21 to 0.40 as moderate, and above 0.40 as high.  Using these three grids it is
easy to see that the highest correlations among returns occur among the southeast Asian economies now
mired in crises, Indonesia, Malaysia. Philippines, and Thailand.  It is also evident that high intra-regional
pairwise correlations are rare and that the highest correlation in Latin America is between Argentine and
Mexican stock returns.
Hence, on the basis of liquidity and correlation considerations, one would expect a higher degree of
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cross-market hedging across the four southeast Asian countries (although they are only moderately liquid)
and among Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Mexico (two of which are comparatively liquid) and all four are
correlated.   Yet, formally investigating this possible channel of interconnectedness is fraught with
difficulty.  First, unlike the prevalence of bank lending, these transmission channels are relatively recent, as
emerging market funds and portfolio flows to these countries, were virtually nonexistent prior to the 1990s. 
Secondly, there may be marked swings in the liquidity of these markets, as sovereign debt can cease to be
considered a liquid asset overnight.
With these shortcomings in mind, and taking the results as tentative, we formed two clusters of
countries that exhibited a high degree of comovement in their asset returns.  The first cluster includes the
four southeast Asian economies in our sample. South Korea, had it been part of our sample, would have
excluded from this cluster on the basis of its low historical correlations with the East Asia four.  For Latin
America the high correlation cluster includes Argentina, Mexico, and Peru.  Needless to say, a shortcoming
of these clusters is that they are based entirely on recent correlations and give no weight to the role of
market liquidity. The joint conditional and unconditional probabilities for the high-correlation groupings are
reported in Table 9.  In terms of the comparison between conditional and unconditional probabilities, the
conditional probability of this cluster at 80.4 percent (for the 50 percent and above category) is well above
the unconditional probability, although the improvement is not as substantial as that obtained from the bank
cluster.  However, the QPS scores paint a very compelling picture–the QPS scores that control for crises
elsewhere in the cluster are significantly higher than those that just control for fundamentals.  Furthermore,
the improvement in forecasting accuracy is bigger than that obtained with the bank clusters. However, it is
important to be cautious about over- interpreting these results as the incidence of portfolio flows and the
widespread use of cross-market hedges has a much shorter history than bank lending in this sample and it is
a phenomenon of the 1990s.
3. Trade links
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Perhaps because trade in goods and services has a longer history in the post World War II period
than trade in financial assets, or because of far better data availability, trade links have received the most
attention in the literature on contagion.  In this subsection we examine two types of trade links.  The most
obvious is bilateral trade among other countries and the infected country(ies).  The second type of link is
more difficult to quantify, which involves competition in a common third market.  For the countries in Asia
and Latin America in our sample, identifying a common third party is not a difficult task.  The United
States figures prominently in trade with Latin America (not unlike the bank credit clusters) and Japan
figures prominently in Asian trade.  However, all five crisis countries in Asia in 1997 also export
extensively to Hong Kong and Singapore.  While sharing a third party is a necessary condition for the
competitive devaluation story it is clearly not a sufficient one.  If a country that exports bananas to the
United States devalues it is not obvious why this would have any detrimental effect on a country that
exports semiconductors to the United States.  Hence, clearly the composition of trade will play a key role in
determining whether the third party trade links carry any weight.  Previous studies that have examined the
trade links have not addressed this issue altogether.
Tables 10 and 11 convey information about the extent of bilateral trade and third party trade on the
eve of three crises episodes, the debt crisis, the Mexican peso crisis of 1994, and the Asian crisis of 1997. 
There are several features worth noting.  As regards the most recent crises, it is hard to see bilateral trade
as the force behind contagion.  The share of exports that is destined to other Asian crises countries
(including Korea) is not very large.  For instance, Malaysia’s exports to Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines,
and Thailand combined only amount to 9 percent of its exports.  For this reason we do not identify an
Asian bilateral trade cluster. Understanding why Brazil and Mexico have been so adversely affected in the
aftermath of the Asian flu is even harder as, on average only 2.3 percent of Latin American exports go to
the Asian five. The most compelling case for bilateral trade links between the Asian crises countries and
Latin America is clearly Chile, whose exports to Asia have been rising over time.  Similarly, on the eve of
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the Tequila crisis only 1.7 percent of Argentine exports were destined for Mexico.12  Yet clearly, important
bilateral trade links are revealed in Tables 10 and 11. Most noticeable is the high level of bilateral trade
among the Mercosur members (Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay) and also Chile.  Hence, a devaluation of
the real would be expected to have important consequences for Argentina and Uruguay by way of
trade–although it is important to remember that Argentina and Brazil are still relatively closed economies,
with ratios of trade as a percent of GDP far below those recorded in the Asian and European countries in
our sample.
The case for third-party trade links is much more compelling for some of the Asian countries. 
Table 12 shows that Malaysia and Korea, in particular, export many of the same goods to the same third
parties.  This leaves Indonesia largely unexplained. Third party trade also does not appear to account for
the Tequila effects on Argentina and Brazil, whose exports have little in common with Mexican exports.
To examine these issues more formally, we constructed three trade clusters, a Latin American
bilateral trade cluster which consists of the Mercosur members and Chile; a third-party Asian group, which
does not include Indonesia as its structure of exports is very distinct from the others and; a third-party
Latin group which includes Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela.  These four countries have the
largest share of bilateral trade with the United States and some similarities in the structure of their exports. 
For instance coffee plays a prominent role in both Colombian and Brazilian exports while oil plays a
similar role for Mexico and Venezuela and, to a lesser extent, Colombia. As with the bank and correlation
clusters, we jointly estimate the conditional and unconditional probabilities for the third-party trade Asian
and Latin American clusters.  For bilateral trade, only the results for Latin America are reported, given that
no Asian bilateral trade cluster was identified.
The results are reported in Table 14.  The strongest results are those for the Latin American
bilateral trade cluster, where the difference between the conditional and unconditional probability is 47.3
percent, which compares favorably with the results reported in Table 1, which are on the basis of crisis
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elsewhere and do not control for how elsewhere is defined.  However, the third-party (and the bilateral)
trade clusters do not compare favorably to the two financial linkages clusters results reported in Tables 6
and 9.  Also, while the QPS scores decline when we control for crises elsewhere in the trade cluster, these
improvements are not statistically significant when compared to the scores of the forecasts that control only
for fundamentals.  Hence, by these criteria, both types of trade clusters underperform the financial sector
links previously discussed.
V. Recent Episodes and Conclusions
To sum up, our analysis suggests that susceptibility to contagion is highly nonlinear.  Furthermore,
when the number of crises in a given cluster is high–financial sector links via common bank lenders are a
powerful channel of fundamentals-based contagion; the difference between the conditional and
unconditional probability, P(C*CE)-P(C), for the bank cluster is the highest at 52 percent (a 165 percent
increase).  This performance is followed by the high-correlation cluster [P(C*CE)-P(C)=47.1, which
represents a 141 percent increase] , bilateral links [P(C*CE)-P(C)=47.3, which is a 126 percent increase],
and a less impressive performance by the third-part trade cluster [P(C*CE)-P(C)=30.7], which is only
somewhat higher than the global crisis elsewhere results [P(C*CE)-P(C)=25.7]. Besides these ordinal
rankings, the QPS scores indicate an improvement in forecasting accuracy for all clusters; however, only in
the case of the bank cluster and the high-correlation cluster are these improvements statistically significant
at standard confidence levels. In the remainder of this final section we next turn our attention to two recent
“contagious” episodes, the aftermath of the Mexican peso crisis and the floatation of the Thai baht. The
aim is to assess through which channels these crises spread. We discuss both trade and financial links.
As regards the potential role of bilateral and third party trade linkages in these recent episodes,
Malaysia would be the most closely linked with Thailand, with Korea and the Philippines having more
moderate exposure.  Trade can certainly not help explain Argentina and Brazil following the Mexican
devaluation nor Indonesia following the Thai crisis.  Exposure to Japanese banks, which pulled out rapidly
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across the region was common to all the affected countries except Hong Kong.  While both Brazil and
Argentina are in the same U.S. bank cluster as Mexico, banks were not at the heart of the problem in 1994
as they were in the early 1980s.  
Most of the affected Asian countries, except Korea had high asset return correlations with
Thailand, although none except Hong Kong had particularly liquid markets. The same is true of stock
returns in Argentina, which have the highest correlation with Mexico of any country in the region.  Here it
is hard to separate cause and effect.  A high correlation may reflect past contagion, but to the extent that
current cross-hedging strategies use such historical correlations as a guide, it could be the vehicle for future
contagion. In sum, it would appear that financial sector linkages, be it through banks of through
international capital markets have much to say in how shocks are propagated in recent crises episodes,
particularly for Argentina, Brazil, and Indonesia.
We have examined the incidence of contagion and some of the channels through which
fundamentals-based contagion can arise.  Some of the arrangements that have linked countries together are
quite old--trade in goods and services and strong ties through a common bank lender and can help shed light
on earlier crises clusters, like the debt crisis of the early 1980s.  Indeed, trade links and exposure to a
common creditor appear to help explain the observed historical pattern of contagion. Yet, one should be
cautious about extrapolation, as some of the channels through which shocks are transmitted are relatively
new to emerging markets.  After all, less than a decade ago there were only a handful of mutual funds that
had any exposure to emerging markets to begin with.  Cross-market hedges have become commonplace in
emerging market trades.  Clearly, these financial market channels need to be better understood and
quantified if policymakers around the globe hope to develop a “financial architecture” that makes countries
less crisis prone and susceptible to contagion. 
References
Baig, T. and I. Goldfajn, 1998, Financial Market Contagion in the Asian Crisis, (Washington, DC, International
Monetary Fund).
19
Calvo, G.A.,1998, Capital Market Contagion and Recession: An Explanation of the Russian Virus, (College Park,
Maryland, University of Maryland).
Calvo, G.A. and E. Mendoza, 1998, Rational Herd Behavior and the Globalization of Securities Markets,
(College Park, Maryland, University of Maryland).
Calvo, S. and C.M. Reinhart, 1996, Capital Flows to Latin America : Is There Evidence of Contagion Effects? in:
G.A. Calvo, M.Goldstein, and E. Hochreitter, eds., Private Capital Flows to Emerging Markets, (Washington DC:
Institute for International Economics.) 
Corsetti, G., P.Pesenti, N.Roubini, C.Tille, 1998, Structural Links and Contagion Effects in the Asian Crisis: A
Welfare Based Approach” (New York, New York University).
Eichengreen, B., A. Rose and C. Wyplosz, 1996, Contagious Currency Crises, National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper No. 5681.
Frankel, J.A., and S. Schmukler, 1998, Crisis contagion, and country funds, in” R. Glick, ed., Managing Capital
Flows and Exchange Rates (Cambridge University Press).
Glick, R., and A. Rose, 1998, Contagion and Trade: Why are currency crises regional?, (Berkeley, University of
California).
Kaminsky, G.L., 1998, Currency and banking crises: The early warnings of distress, International Finance
Discussion Paper No. 629, October, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Kaminsky, G.L., and C.M. Reinhart, 1996, The twin crises: The causes of banking and balance of payments
problems, forthcoming in American Economic Review.
Kaminsky, G.L., and S. Schmukler, 1999, What triggers market jitters? A chronicle of the Asian crisis,
International Finance Discussion Paper No. 634, April, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Wolf, H.C., 1997, Regional contagion effects in emerging markets, Working Papers in International Economics,
G-97-03, Princeton University.
20
Table 1.  The Incidence of Global Contagion: Currency Crises, 1970-1998
Proportion of other
sample countries with
crises (in percent)
Noise-to-signal
ratio, N/S
Unconditional
probability of a
crisis
Probability of
a crisis
conditioned on
crises
elsewhere,
P(C*CE)
Difference between
conditional and
unconditional
probability of a
crisis, P(C*CE) -
P(C)
0 to 25 1.23 29.0 20.0 -9.0
25 to 50 0.64 29.0 33.0 4.0
50 and above 0.26 29.0 54.7 25.7
Memorandum items:
Real exchange rate1 0.10 29.0 67.0 38.0
Imports 1.10 29.0 26.0 -3.0
1 The real exchange rate is used as a comparison as it provides the best performance among the univariate
indicators considered in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) and Kaminsky (1998).  By contrast, imports were among
the indicators which fared among the worst.
Table 2.  The Incidence and Evolution of Regional Contagion: 
Asia, Europe and Latin America
Full sample: 1970 to 1998
Proportion of
other sample
countries in the
region with crises
Asia Europe Latin America
(in percent) N/S P(C) P(C*CE) N/S P(C) P(C*CE) N/S P(C) P(C*CE)
0 to 25 1.37 26.8 19.8 1.37 28.6 14.7 1.29 29.4 18.3
25 to 50    1.30 26.8 15.3 0.58 28.6 32.3 0.77 29.4 30.8
50 and above 0.03 26.8 67.4 0.51 28.6 35.0 0.16 29.4 68.6
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Table 3. Contagion and the Fundamentals: the Quadratic Probability Scores
1970-1998
Naive
(1)
Contagion
(2)
Fundamentals
(3)
Fundamentals and
Contagion (4)
Difference between
columns (4) and (3) (in
percent)
Full Sample 0.386 0.350 0.313 0.308 1.6
Asia 0.285 0.239 0.301 0.213 29.2
Europe 0.378 0.325 0.316 0.297 6.0
Latin America 0.380 0.334 0.304 0.289 4.9
Table 4. Banks: Liabilities as a Percent of Borrower’s Total Liabilities
on the Eve of the Tequila and Asian Flu Crises
Liabilities to Japan Liabilities to the United States
Borrower: as of June 1994 as of December 1996 as of June 1994 as of December 1996
Asia average 37.2 30.1 12.8 12.2
  China 39.5 32.3 1.9 4.9
  Indonesia 54.0 39.7 7.7 9.5
  Korea 29.4 24.3 10.0 9.4
  Malaysia 40.2 36.9 11.3 10.5
  Philippines 17.2 11.7 39.4 29.4
  Thailand 56.8 53.5 7.1 7.2
Latin America
average
7.1 5.2 28.8 26.3
  Argentina 5.3 4.0 31.2 29.5
  Brazil 10.6 7.6 22.7 27.1
  Chile 8.8 5.2 31.2 27.9
  Colombia 13.0 7.8 26.6 24.6
  Mexico 7.3 8.7 34.2 28.4
  Peru 7.5 2.9 15.9 17.4
  Uruguay 0.7 0.8 35.2 30.2
  Venezuela 3.7 4.2 33.3 25.6
Sources: Bank of International Settlements, The Maturity, Sectoral, and Nationality Distribution of International Bank
Lending and United States Treasury, Treasury Bulletin.
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Table 5 Banks: Liabilities as a Percent of Lender’s Total Liabilities
on the Eve of the Debt, Tequila, and Asian Flu Crises
Liabilities to Japan Liabilities to the United States
Borrower: as of June 1994as of December
1996
as of June 1982as of June 1994 as of December
1996
Asia sub-total 53.6 67.3 10.1 18.1 24.4
  China 9.7 10.3 0.1 0.7 2.1
  Indonesia 11.7 13.0 0.2 2.6 4.1
  Korea 9.9 14.3 5.4 5.2 7.2
  Malaysia 3.9 4.8 0.2 1.7 1.8
  Philippines 0.7 0.9 2.0 2.6 3.0
  Thailand 14.6 22.1 0.4 2.8 3.9
Latin America
sub-total
7.1 5.8 61.5 58.8 48.6
  Argentina 1.2 1.1  8.4 10.6 10.2
  Brazil 3.9 3.0 16.1 13.0 14.2
  Chile 0.6 0.5 4.0 3.6 3.3
  Colombia  0.8 0.8 1.9 2.5 3.2
  Mexico 3.0 3.2 22.2 21.8 13.4
  Peru 0.2 0.1 1.6 0.5 1.1
  Uruguay 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.3 1.0
  Venezuela 0.4 0.3 7.0 5.5 2.2
Sources: Bank of International Settlements, The Maturity, Sectoral, and Nationality Distribution of International Bank
Lending and United States Treasury, Treasury Bulletin.
Notes: Lender’s total claims represent the total claims on developing countries, excluding other BIS countries and offshore
banking centers.
23
Table 6.  Contagion and Banking Clusters
Proportion of
other sample
countries in the
region with crises
Bank Clusters
(in percent) N/S P(C) P(C*CE) P(C*CE)-P(C) [P(C*CE)-P(C)]/ P(C)
0 to 25 1.507 31.5 19.2 -12.3 -39.0
25 to 50 0.903 31.5 28.4 -3.1 -0.9
50 and above 0.071 31.5 83.5 52.0 165.0
Quadratic Probability Scores
Naive
(1)
Contagion
(2)
Fundamentals
(3)
Fundamentals
and Contagion
(4)
Difference between
columns (4) and (3)
and standard error1
(5) 
Score 0.394 0.291 0.304 0.245 -0.059*
(0.017)
Notes: An asterisk denotes significance at standard confidence levels.  The Japanese bank cluster includes Indonesia, Malaysia,
and Thailand.  United States bank cluster includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, the Philippines, Uruguay, and
Venezuela.
1 The standard error was estimated with robust methods.
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Table 7. Daily Stock Price Index Correlations: December1991 to December 1996
(US Dollars)
Country Arg. Bra. Chi. Col. Ind. Kor. Mal. Mex. Per. Phi. Rus. Tha Tur . Ve
n 
Argentina 1.00
Brazil 0.37 1.00     
Chile 0.38 0.24 1.00
Colombia -0.01 0.15 0.02 1.00
Indonesia 0.38 0.28 0.39 0.20 1.00
Korea 0.09 0.00 0.20 0.13 0.10 1.00
Malaysia 0.17 -0.09 0.12 0.02 0.50 0.20 1.00
Mexico 0.56 0.36 0.34 -0.10 0.32 0.29 0.28 1.00
Peru 0.44 0.40 0.45 0.21 0.22 0.32 0.14 0.53 1.00
Philippines 0.35 0.05 0.25 0.24 0.63 0.09 0.61 0.30 0.29 1.00
Russia 0.15 0.10 0.49 -0.14 -0.19 -0.19 -0.14 0.10 0.30 0.26 1.00
Thailand 0.25 0.01 0.37 0.05 0.54 0.24 0.60 0.30 0.24 0.68 0.02 1.00
Turkey 0.02 0.11 -0.07 -0.05 0.27 0.11 0.18 -0.04 -0.04 0.18 -0.39 0.14 1.00
Venezuela 0.24 0.16 0.01 0.24 0.18 0.16 0.12 -0.06 0.012 0.32 0.22 0.09 -0.08 1.00
Source: International Finance Corporation, Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 1997.
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Table 8. Emerging Market Mutual Fund Holdings
Country Major Country Holdings
June 30, 1997
US$ billions Percent
Total Asia 85.04 55.55
Bangladesh 0.03 0.02
China 3.74 2.44
Hong Kong 23.46 15.33
India 8.98 5.87
Indonesia 6.66 4.35
Korea 9.43 6.16
Malaysia 9.01 5.88
Pakistan 0.71 0.46
Philippines 3.68 2.40
Singapore 5.03 3.29
Sri Lanka 0.21 0.14
Taiwan 10.00 6.53
Thailand 4.11 2.68
Total Latin America 44.02 28.75
Argentina 4.56 2.98
Brazil 20.01 13.07
Chile 4.36 2.85
Colombia 0.81 0.53
Mexico 11.76 7.68
Peru 1.33 0.87
Venezuela 1.19 0.78
Notes: The figures cover all dedicated emerging market funds--both regional and single country--that are
registered or listed in a developed market (excluding the emerging market funds that are registered and traded in
the emerging markets themselves.)
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Table 9.  Contagion and High Correlation Clusters
   
Proportion of
other sample
countries in the
region with
crises
High Correlation Cluster
(in percent) N/S P(C) P(C*CE) P(C*CE)-P(C) [P(C*CE)-P(C)]/
P(C)
0 to 25 5.100 33.3  5.5 -27.8 -83.5
25 to 50 0.577 33.3 54.1 20.8 62.5
50 and above 0.389 33.3 80.4 47.1 141.4
Quadratic Probability Scores 
Naive
(1)
Contagion
(2)
Fundamentals
(3)
Fundamentals
and Contagion
(4)
Difference between
columns (4) and (3)
and standard error1
(5) 
Score 0.381 0.186 0.343 0.158 -0.185*
(0.014)
Notes: An asterisk denotes significance at standard confidence levels. The Asian high correlation cluster includes
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.  The Latin American cluster includes Argentina, Brazil, and
Peru.
1 The standard error was estimated with robust methods.
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Table 10. Asia and Latin America Inter- and Intra-Regional Trade: Exports to Asia
Country Exports to the rest of  Emerging Asia1 Exports to the rest of Emerging Asia and
China, Hong Kong, Japan, and Singapore
1982 1995 1997 1982 1995 1997
Asia Average  6.8   9.0  9.6 48.8 54.7 54.7
Indonesia 4.4 12.2 12.8 69.7 56.6 55.7
Korea 4.1  7.8  9.7 30.0 48.7 49.6
Malaysia  8.1  9.0 9.9 61.1 56.8 59.3
Philippines  8.0  9.8  7.7 40.2 41.7 40.9
Thailand  9.4  6.3  8.0 41.9 52.6 52.7
Exports to Emerging Asia Exports to Emerging Asia and China,
 Hong Kong, Japan, and Singapore
1982 1995 1997 1982 1995 1997
Latin America
Average
1.2 2.3 2.0 9.0 10.5 8.7
Argentina 0.6  2.8  3.3 7.4 13.4 13.2
Brazil 1.8  4.6  3.8 10.7 17.5 14.4
Chile 1.4  8.3  9.9 16.1 33.7 37.5
Colombia 0.2 0.6 0.3 4.6 6.0 3.6
Mexico 1.4 0.2 0.1 8.8 2.4 2.0
Peru 3.2  5.8  4.1 21.1 26.0 23.6
Uruguay 0.2  1.4 1.4 3.4 11.7 10.1
Venezuela 0.3 0.1 0.1 5.1 2.7 1.9
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics.
I Other emerging Asia includes those countries listed in the table.
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Table 11. Asia and Latin America Inter- and Intra-Regional Trade: Exports to Latin America
Country Exports to Latin America Exports to Latin America and the United States
1982 1995 1997 1982 1995 1997
Asia Average 2.4 2.4 2.5 20.7 21.8 21.7
Indonesia 4.2 1.4 1.1 20.0 18.1 17.5
Korea 3.1 4.7 4.7 31.9 24.0 21.0
Malaysia 0.3 1.6 1.5 12.0 22.3 19.8
Philippines 0.9 1.0 2.4 32.5 36.9 37.1
Thailand 0.2 1.0 0.9 12.9 18.7 20.6
Exports to the rest of Latin America Exports to the rest of Latin America and the
United States
1982 1995 1997 1982 1995 1997
Latin America
Average
19.8 18.9 20.4 50.2 66.1 71.3
Argentina 20.4 40.9 49.3 33.8 49.9 57.1
Brazil 15.6 23.0 27.7 36.1 41.9 45.4
Chile 19.4 19.2 16.8 41.0 33.1 32.5
Colombia 21.7 29.7 28.4 45.0 63.8 66.6
Mexico 8.8 5.6 6.0 61.2 89.9 91.6
Peru 11.0 17.1 18.2 42.0 34.4 44.4
Uruguay 30.5 53.3 56.0 38.3 59.3 62.0
Venezuela 39.5 33.6 33.8 66.3 82.8 85.4
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics.
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Table 12 The Composition of Exports:
Argentinean and Brazilian Exports of Mexico’s Top Exports
(Percent of total Exports, 1994)
Description Mexico Argentina Brazil
Oil 10.8 7.1 0.0
Automobiles 8.6 1.2 1.2
Insulated electric wire 4.8 0.1 0.1
Televisions 4.3 0.1 0.0
Engine parts 3.8 0.9 2.0
Automobile parts 3.4 2.6 2.9
Radio/amplifier parts 3.2 0.1 0.1
Electric switches, relays,
etc.
3.2 1.3 0.3
Other electric machinery 2.7 0.0 0.1
Computers 2.0 0.3 0.2
Transportation vehicles 1.6 1.7 2.0
Semi conductors 1.5 0.0 0.2
Radios 1.5 0.1 0.7
Furniture 1.4 0.1 0.7
Electric power machinery 1.3 0.0 0.3
Total 54.1 15.6 10.9
Source: Statistics Canada, World Trade Database.
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Table 13 Composition of Exports: Asian Exports of Top Thai Exports
(Percent of exports, 1996)
Description Thailand Korea Indonesia Malaysia Philippines
Radio/amplifier parts 4.8 3.8 2.0 7.3 2.5
Semiconductors 5.3 15.4 0.3 18.0 9.1
Footwear 3.7 1.0 4.3 0.1 0.9
Calculation machines 4.6 0.7 0.5 6.6 1.0
Electric switches, relays, etc. 1.7 1.1 0.4 1.9 0.8
Computers and accessories 5.1 3.2 0.4 2.9 1.5 
Jewelry 1.7 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.2
Televisions 1.7 1.5 0.1 3.0 0.4
Refrigerators 1.5 0.4 0.1 1.4 0.0
Shellfish 4.3 0.3 2.3 0.2 1.7
Rubber 4.4 0.0 4.2 2.2 0.2
Fish 1.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.7
Rice 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 44.3 27.9 15.4 44.4 18.8
Source: Statistics Canada, World Trade Database.
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Table 14.  Contagion and Trade Clusters
Proportion of
other sample
countries in
the region with
crises
 Third Party Trade Clusters Latin American High Bilateral Trade
Cluster
(in percent) N/S P(C) P(C*CE) P(C*CE)-
P(C)
[P(C*CE)-
P(C)]/
P(C)
N/S P(C) P(C*CE) P(C*CE)-
P(C)
[P(C*C
E)-
P(C)]/
P(C)
0 to 25 1.51 27.6 21.8 -5.8 -21.0 0.53 37.4 29.3 -8.1 -21.4
25 to 50 1.54 27.6 21.3 -6.3 -22.8 2.34 37.4 15.6 -21.8 -58.3
50 and above 0.57 27.6 58.3 30.7 111.2 0.08 37.4 84.7 47.3 126.0
Quadratic Probability Scores
Naive
(1)
Contagion
(2)
Fundamentals
(3)
Fundamentals
and Contagion 
(4)
Difference between
columns (4) and (3)
and standard error1
(5) 
Score
Third Party
Trade
0.375 0.354 0.312 0.283 -0.029
(0.018)
Score
Latin America
bilateral trade
0.433 0.377 0.345 0.314 -0.031
(0.017)
Notes:  The Asian third party cluster includes Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.  The Latin American third
party includes Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela; the bilateral trade cluster includes the Mercosur countries
plus Chile.  Since there is little bilateral trade among the five affected countries no bilateral cluster is reported.
1 The standard error was estimated with robust methods.
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1. Eichengreen, et. al. (1996), Glick and Rose (1998), and Wolf (1997) all examined the scope for trade
links.
2. See Gerlach and Smets (1995) Corsetti et. al. (1998).
3. As a story of fundamentals-based contagion, of course, this explanation does not speak to the fact that
central banks often go to great lengths to avoid the devaluation in the first place.
4. European banks had also increased their exposure to Asia in recent years.
5. Problems with limited data availability, particularly for financial indicators, precluded us from
including countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. A full description of the data set is presented in
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996).
6. See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) for details.
7. For a detailed discussion of the construction of the adjusted noise-to-signal ratio see Kaminsky
and Reinhart (1996).
8. See Calvo and Reinhart (1996).
9.Hence, we have the following two by two matrix,
Crisis occurs in the
following 24
months
No crisis occurs in
the following 24
months
A signal is issued A B
No signal is issued C D
A “perfect” indicator would only have entries in cells A and D and a noise-to-signal ratio (calculated
as [B/(B+D)/A(A+C)]) of zero.
10. The noise-to-signals ratios for the indicators are given in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996).
11. The crisis elsewhere criteria does not distinguish between being in a particular cohort or outside
it.
12.  These bilateral trade statistics are not reported in the tables but are available from the authors.
Footnotes
